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Haas: Libel and Slander: Limiting Privilage for Voluntary Statements Gi

LIBEL AND SLANDER: LIMITING PRIVILEGE FOR
VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS GIVEN PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGES*
Fridovichv. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1992)
Respondent filed a defamation action against petitioner,' his sibling,
relating to voluntary statements made to police officers. 2 Respondent
alleged that his siblings had plotted to have him falsely accused for
the death of their father.3 In furtherance of this plot, petitioner had
purchased a stress analyzer to determine the best liar among the
siblings.4 The two most convincing liars then gave statements to the
police which became the subject of respondent's defamation suit. 5 The
trial court dismissed the complaint 6 and respondent appealed to the
Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida.7 The district court affirmed the dismissal in part," holding that statements made to investigating authorities prior to the filing of criminal charges are absolutely
privileged. 9 Nevertheless, the district court certified the question,
whether such statements should be absolutely privileged, to the
Florida Supreme Court. 10 The Florida Supreme Court answered the
question in the negative and HELD, defamatory statements voluntarily made to police officers prior to the institution of criminal charges
are qualifiedly privileged."
Historically, the rule of privilege encouraged the free flow of facts
and information by protecting individuals from the threat of civil liability when they made statements in certain situations.12 While the
*To my parents, Robert and Lois Haas: Thank you for your continuing love, support, and
understanding.
1. Among the defendants in the original suit were four of respondent's siblings, a brother-inlaw, and an ex-brother-in-law. Fridovich v. Fridovich, 573 So. 2d 65, 66 (4th DCA 1990), rev'd,
598 So. 2d 65 (Fla., 1992).
2. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 66.
3. Id. at 68.
4. Id. at 66.
5. Id.
6. Id. The complaint contained additional counts for intentional infliction of mental distress
and malicious prosecution. Id.
7. Id. at 65-66.
8. Id. at 66. The district court also affirmed the dismissal of the count for malicious prosecution, but reversed the dismissal of the count for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
9. Frdovich, 573 So. 2d at 71.
10. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 65-66.
11. Id. at 69.
12. Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9
COLUm. L. REV. 463 (1909).
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general principle has remained the same, two classes of privilege have
evolved under common law. An individual can now claim either absolute or qualified privilege, depending upon the circumstances in which
the communication was made. 13 Statements accorded absolute privilege
can never be the basis for civil liability for defamation. 14 However, a
statement which is only qualifiedly privileged may expose individuals
to liability if spoken with express or actual malice. 15 Thus, whether
or not a cause of action for defamation exists depends on the classification of the privilege.
In Myers v. Hodges,16 the Florida Supreme Court examined the
issue of absolute versus qualified privileges in the context of statements made during judicial proceedings. The plaintiff in Myers brought
an action for allegedly defamatory statements contained in a bill in
equity.17 The defendant filed a demurrer to the evidence, and the trial
court rendered a verdict for the defendant.' 8 On appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed, and held that statements made in judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged if they are relevant to the subject

of inquiry.19
The Myers court concluded that statements not relevant to the
inquiry of the judicial proceeding should only be accorded a qualified
privilege.2° Liability would arise only if the plaintiff could prove that
the irrelevant statements were made with express malice. 21 Before
rendering its decision, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the origins

13. See id. at 464-65. The words qualified or conditional are used interchangeably in describing the second class of privileges. See id.
14. Id. at 464. No liability for defamation can originate from statements which are absolutely
privileged even if they are false and malicious. Id.
15. See Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 806 (Fla. 1984). Under common law, the
elements of actual and express malice differ. Id. Actual malice is present when a statement
contains a known falsity or a reckless disregard of the truth, and it must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. Actual malice is required for public figures or public officials to
recover in a defamation action. Id. Express malice is present when the primary purpose for
the statement is to injure the reputation of another, and it need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 806-07. Express malice is the ordinary standard used in defamation
actions. Id. at 807.
16. 44 So. 357 (Fla. 1907).
17. Id. at 358.
18. Id. at 359. The trial court instructed the jury to find for the defendant. Id.
19. Id. at 361.
20.

Id.

21. Id. at 362. The court in Myers found that the allegedly defamatory statements must
not have been relevant to the proceedings because the lower court had them stricken from the
bill. Id. at 363. Thus, the statements were only granted a qualified privilege. Id. Because the
court found no evidence of express malice it upheld the verdict for the defendant. Id. at 364.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/5

2

Haas: Libel and Slander: Limiting Privilage for Voluntary Statements Gi
CASE COMMENTS

of privilege in American common law and acknowledged that the
privilege doctrine was established to promote the free flow of information.2 However, the court did not find it acceptable that an individual
could abuse this privilege by making defamatory statements wholly
unrelated to the inquiry. 23 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court attempted
to limit the applicability of absolute privilege in Myers by establishing
the bounds of qualified privilege.?
The Florida Supreme Court further defined the principle of absolute
m when it evaluated
privilege in Robertsonv. IndustrialInsurance Co.,?
the extent to which a statement could be considered "within a judicial
proceeding."' In Robertson, the alleged defamatory statements were
contained in a letter sent to the Insurance Commissioner of Florida.The trial court dismissed the complaint and held that the statements were absolutely privileged because they occurred in a quasi-judicial proceeding.2 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that statements made in the course of an administrative hearing
are quasi-judicial in nature.2 Therefore, the court treated the statements as if they were made in a judicial proceeding. ° Consequently,
they were protected by absolute privilege. 31
The Florida Supreme Court's determination that the letter was
published in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding was essential to
the Robertson decision.3 This determination centered upon the principle that the rule of privilege "arises immediately upon the doing of
any acts required or permitted by law in the due course of the judicial
proceedings or as necessarily preliminary thereto."' The Robertson
court viewed the letter as necessarily preliminary to the administrative

22. Id. at 361. When Myers was decided, under English law all statements made in judicial
proceedings were absolutely privileged, whether or not they were relevant to the inquiry. Id.
at 360. The Myers court did not find this view accepted by American courts and determined
that a statement must be relevant in order to be accorded absolute privilege. Id. at 361.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 362.
25. 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954).
26. Id. at 199.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 199-200.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 200.
32. See id. at 199. Although the Robertson court never directly stated that the letter was
a part of a judicial proceeding, the letter could not have been granted absolute privilege unless
the court had made this determination.
33. Id. (quoting Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929)).
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hearing.3 The court then considered whether statements made with
respect to an administrative hearing should be protected by absolute
privilege. Acknowledging the historical importance of privilege,3 the
Robertson court held that all persons involved in administrative hearings should be protected from the threat of liability for statements
made preliminary to or during those proceedings. 37
Although the Robertson court extended the right of absolute
privilege to a letter requesting an investigatory hearing,3 in Ridge v.
Rademacher,s9 the Third District Court of Appeal refused to extend
that right to voluntary statements made to police officers regarding
an alleged crime. 40 In Ridge, the trial court dismissed a defamation
suit relating to statements made to a police officer. 41 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling and held that unsworn
statements to police officers given prior to the filing of charges should
42
not be given absolute privilege.

The Ridge court held that, as a matter of law, absolute privilege
should not bar a defamation action relating to unsworn statements
made to police officers. 43 The court stated that those unsworn state-

ments should only receive a qualified privilege which could be overcome upon a showing of actual malice.- The Ridge court found this
standard particularly appropriate in cases where the plaintiff alleges
4
the statements were made maliciously.

The instant court concurred with the Ridge holding ' and held that
defamatory statements voluntarily made to police officers prior to the
institution of criminal charges are only qualifiedly privileged. 47 Thus,
the instant court's holding was a retreat from the rationale in

34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 200. The court acknowledged that absolute privilege encourages the free flow
of information by protecting individuals from the threat of civil liability. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
39. 402 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. However, the court recognized that absolute privilege may be accorded to sworn
statements made during a judicial hearing and to unsworn statements given in legislative and
executive proceedings. Id. n.1.
43. Id. at 1312.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
47. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69.
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Robertson which guaranteed an absolute privilege for all relevant
statements made preliminary to a judicial proceeding. 4s The ruling in
the instant case is significant not only because of prior inconsistencies
within the Florida courts,49 but also because of the differing opinions
reached by courts in other jurisdictions and the contrasting views
espoused by prominent authorities. 50
As a preface to its holding, the instant court acknowledged that
under Florida law all statements made during judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged. 51 However, the court did not presume this rule
necessarily applied to statements made to police officers prior to the
filing of criminal charges. s2 The instant court concerned itself primarily
with the determination of that issue.5

48. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
49. Fridovich,598 So. 2d at 66-67. Compare Ange v. State, 123 So. 916 (Fla. 1929) (holding
that the limitations of absolute privilege include any act preliminary to a judicial proceeding)
and Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954) (following the holding in Ange)
with Ridge v. Rademacher, 402 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that unsworn statements
to police officers are not absolutely privileged) and Anderson v. Shands, 570 So. 2d 1121 (Fla.
1st DCA 1990) (holding that statements given during a police investigation are subject to
qualified rather than absolute privilege).
50. CompareFridovich, 598 So. 2d at 67-68 (acknowledging that the majority of jurisdictions
hold that an informal complaint to a prosecutor is qualifledly privileged) with W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 819-20 (5th ed. 1984) (stating
that an informal complaint to a prosecutor was an initial step in a judicial proceeding and thus
absolutely privileged) and RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8.0313][c] (1991)
(stating that although a complaint to a prosecutor was before the judicial proceeding, it was
absolutely privileged). The district court in Fridovicheven noted a conflict within the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Fridovich, 573 So. 2d at 70. The court noted that § 587 states that all
statements made preliminary to a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. Id. "(quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 547 (1977). However, Comment e of the same section
limits this protection to statements made in good faith and with serious contemplation of a
judicial proceeding. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 cmt. e (1977)).
Thus, the court inferred that knowingly false and malicious statements should not be protected
by absolute privilege. Id. According to the court, the Restatement cautions that such statements
should not be protected under the cloak of absolute protection. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 cmt. e (1977)).
51. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 66 (citing Myers v. Hodges, 44 So. 357 (Fla. 1907)).
52. Id. Some commentators view statements made to police officers as an initial step in
the judicial proceeding and, therefore, deserving of absolute privilege. Id. at 68 (citing KEETON
ET AL., supranote 50; 1 ARTHUR B. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 87 (1969); SMOLLA,
supranote 50). The holding of the instant court implicitly rejects this argument. See id. at 69.
53. Id. at 66. The district court certified the following question to the court: "Are statements
made by a private individual to an investigating officer or a prosecutor preliminary to the filing
of a criminal charge absolutely privileged so as to avoid liability for defamation even when the
statements are false and made with actual malice." Id.
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Absolute privilege affords individuals in a certain position or status
protection from the threat of civil liability.- The instant court realized
that societal interests in obtaining complete details in the course of
judicial proceedings have historically taken precedence over the right
of an individual to vindicate an injured reputation. However, the
particular facts of the instant case convinced the court that the existing
6
rule of privilege was too expansive in the protection it afforded.
Although privilege promotes the free flow of information in judicial
proceedings, the instant court could not conceive of a benefit resulting
from the protection of individuals who knowingly make false and mali57
cious statements to the police.
The instant court reasoned that granting a qualified privilege to
statements given to police officers could adequately protect individuals
from the risk of civil liability- and at the same time prevent exploitation of the privilege. 9 Crucial to the court's reasoning is that individ-

54. Id. at 68 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 584 (1977)). The Restatement
maintains that persons involved in judicial proceedings should be free to speak without the
worry that their statements may be used against them in a civil action. Thus, their statements
should never be subject to analysis for their truth or good will. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 584 (1977)).
55. See id. In recognizing the existence of these competing interests, courts should attempt
to formulate an equitable balance. See id. at 69.
56. Id. at 68. According to the respondent, after an investigation determined that the
shooting death of his father was accidental, his siblings devised a plan to have him falsely
convicted for first degree murder. Id. at 66. In furtherance of this plot, respondent alleges that
his siblings purchased a stress analyzer to determine who was the best liar. Id. Subsequently,
the two most convincing liars, respondent's sister and her former husband, gave false statements
to the police in order to implicate respondent in the death of his father. Id. As a result of these
statements, the respondent was indicted for first degree murder, and was ultimately convicted
of the lesser charge of manslaughter. Id. After the trial the respondent's sister and her former
husband recanted their statements and admitted that they were false. Id.
57. Id. at 69.
58. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice McDonald stated that individuals who give statements
to law enforcement personnel should never be exposed to the threat of liability. Id. at 70
(McDonald, J., dissenting). However, Justice McDonald's dissent is internally contradictory.
Justice McDonald initially asserted that statements to law enforcement personnel should be
absolutely privileged. Id. He believed that malice should not be the decisive factor in determining
whether an individual is liable because most crimes are reported with malice. Id. However, in
his conclusion Justice McDonald stated that no cause of action should arise from statements
made to police officers "when the goal is prosecution of the allegedly defamed person." Id. at
71. This implies that if the goal is something other than the prosecution of the individual then
the statements should not be absolutely privileged.
59. Id. at 69. Qualified privilege would balance the need for obtaining information regarding
criminal activity and the rights of individuals not to be falsely accused. Id. (citing Fridorich,
573 So. 2d at 72).
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uals are not automatically exposed to liability for qualifiedly privileged
defamatory statements. 60 A qualified privilege can only be overcome
upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defamatory
statements were spoken with express malice.61 The instant court maintained that this burden would discourage individuals from filing frivolous suits.6
Additionally, the court recognized that the inherent protections
available within a judicial proceeding are not present when an individual voluntarily makes a statement to police officers.6 Judicial proceedings subject individuals to the risk of prosecution for perjury, as well
as to control by the judge.6 Furthermore, the availability of crossexamination and notice in a judicial proceeding allows individuals the
opportunity to confront their accusers and establish the truth or falsity
of their statements. Unfortunately, these safeguards do not exist
when someone provides information to the police prior to the institution of any criminal charges6 The instant court stated that without
these protections a great imbalance would arise between the rights
of individuals to defend their reputations and society's interest in
obtaining full disclosure.6 To remedy this imbalance, the instant court
held that statements voluntarily made to police officers prior to the
filing of criminal charges should only be granted a qualified privilege.6
The instant court's decision seemingly departs from earlier common
law views of absolute privilege as expressed in Myers69 and
Robertson.70 In those decisions the courts acknowledged that the aim
of absolute privilege is to protect individuals who make statements in
certain situations from the threat of civil liability. 71 Although the instant court narrowed the circumstances in which statements may be

60. Id.
61. Id. Express malice exists when the primary purpose in making a statement is to injure
the reputation of the other person. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 69 n.5 (citation omitted).
64. Id.
65. See id.; see also Fenelon v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that harm to individuals which may result from absolute privilege is mitigated by the
judicial requirements of notice, hearing, and review).
66. See Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69 n.5.
67. Id. at 68-69.
68. Id.
69. Myers, 44 So. at 357; see supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
70. Robertson, 75 So. 2d at 198; see supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 36-37.
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granted an absolute privilege, it nonetheless recognized the need to
preserve the principles behind the rule of privilege.Similar to the Myers' rationale, the instant court concluded that individuals should not have absolute freedom to make defamatory statements under the shield of privilege.3 In Myers, the court maintained
that society's interests would not be served if individuals making defamatory statements wholly irrelevant to judicial proceedings were
granted immunity from liability. 74 The instant court applied the same
rationale to statements made prior to the filing of criminal charges. 75
Thus, although the" context of the holdings in the two cases differs,
the same principle guided both decisions: 6 In fact, the rule from Myers
corresponds with the rule in the instant case because statements that
are made falsely and with actual malice are not relevant in a genuine
judicial proceeding.
Because common law relies on precedent, it is important to understand the principles underlying the holdings of earlier privilege cases.7
In the instant case, the district court found that a qualified privilege
could afford sufficient protection to individuals making statements to
police officers.78 However, the district court was compelled to comply
with the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in Robertson, and held
that such statements are absolutely privileged.7 9 In turn, the Robertson
court relied on the holding in Myers.8 Unfortunately, this reliance on
Myers was misplaced.
In Myers, the defamatory statements were contained in a bill filed
with the court. 81 Undoubtedly, any document filed with a court is
2
absolutely privileged because it is a part of a judicial proceeding.

72. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
73. Compare Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69 (holding that statements made prior to the filing
of criminal charges are only qualifiedly privileged) with Myers, 44 So. at 361-62 (holding that
irrelevant statements should not be accorded absolute privilege).
74. Myers, 44 So. at 361.
75. See supra text accompanying note 57.
76. Compare Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 68-89 (discussing statements made to police officers
prior to the filing of criminal charges) with Myers, 44 So. at 361-62 (discussing irrelevant
statements made during a judicial proceeding).
77. See generally Myers, 44 So. at 360-61 (tracing the history of absolute and qualified
privilege).
78. Fridovich, 573 So. 2d at 70.
79. Id. at 71.
80. Robertson, 75 So. 2d at 199. The Robertson court also relied upon the finding in Ange
that statements necessarily preliminary to a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. Id.
(citing Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929)).
81. Myers, 44 So. at 358.
82. See Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 66 (quoting Ange, 123 So. at 917).
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Therefore, the holding in Myers should not be read too broadly. The
Myers court concerned itself mainly with whether irrelevant statements should be accorded an absolute privilege.8 The court never
intended to define the confines of a judicial proceeding. Nevertheless,
the Robertson court relied on Myers in holding that the letter was
absolutely privileged. 4
The Robertson court also presumed that statements necessarily
preliminary to judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged., Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate what it considered "necessary."8
Taken literally, voluntary statements to police officers are not necessary for the filing of criminal charges because officers may institute
proceedings without such testimony. Thus, the statements in the
instant case would not be absolutely privileged under a strict interpretation of Robertson.s Although police might not learn of criminal activity without voluntary information from .the public, the statements
are technically not 'necessary."'' Unfortunately, if individual courts
are left to determine what is "necessary," absolute privilege will be
applied inconsistently.
The courts in both the instant case and Ridge based their holdings
on the principles behind absolute privilege, rather than the definitions
established by earlier courts. 90 Whether a statement should be absolutely privileged depends upon the situation in which it is communicated. 91 Therefore, any applicable privilege should arise upon the ut-

83. Myers, 44 So. at 360-62.
84. Robertson, 75 So. 2d at 199-200.
85. Id. at 199 (quoting Ange, 123 So. at 917). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587
also takes the view that statements preliminary to a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged.
Frdovich,573 So. 2d at 70 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 (1977)). However,

Comment e of the same section states that this privilege should only apply when the communication is relevant to a proceeding "contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.
...The bare possibility that the proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak
to provide immunity ....

"

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 cmt. e

(1977)). Thus, reading § 587 in its entirety illustrates that the Restatement would not endorse
a blanket policy of absolute privilege for statements made preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
86. See Robertson, 75 So. 2d at 199 (quoting Ange, 123 So. at 917).
87. See generally Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 66 (explaining that an investigation had already
been concluded by the police prior to the time the defamatory statements were made).
88. Compare id. (stating that the initial investigation was completed prior to the time when
defamatory statements were made) with Ange, 123 So. at 917 (holding that statements which
are necessarily preliminary to judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged).
89. See supra note 88.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, 55-57.
91. See Veeder, supra note 12, at 468 (stating that "when the occasion arises, the right
arises").
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terance of the statement.9 If privilege is intended to promote the
reporting of criminal activity, individuals must be assured before they
make a statement that they will be protected from civil liability.9
Under Robertson, individuals theoretically do not know if their
speech is protected by privilege until after a judicial proceeding is
formally instituted.9 If there is no proceeding, then the statement
would not be preliminary to a judicial proceeding and absolute privilege
would not be applicable.9 5 Thus, individuals would be inhibited from
giving information to the police if they first had to calculate the chances
that their statements would necessarily lead to the filing of criminal
charges. However, the rule in the instant case gives individuals notice
that voluntary statements made to police will be treated equally,
whether or not a judicial proceeding results.- Thus, the instant court's
holding encourages disclosure of facts, but discourages the use of ab7
solute privilege to protect false and malicious statements.
Individuals should not be able to seek protection under the law if
they make statements to the police for the sole purpose of unlawfully
injuring another's reputation.9 The instant court recognized the inherent injustice of such protection and limited the circumstances in which
absolute privilege could be applied.9 Undoubtedly, society has a significant interest in obtaining information regarding alleged criminal
activity. -° However, if individuals make false and malicious statements
to the police, the statements most likely have no probative value.
These statements should not be protected by absolute privilege. 1°1 The
instant court's holding is an affirmative step toward establishing an
equitable balance between society's interests and an individual's pri10 2
vate rights.

Felice S. Haas

92. See id.
93. See generally id. (stating that absolute privilege attaches to the situation not the individual).
94. See supra text accompanying note 33. If a statement is only protected when it is
preliminary to a judicial proceeding, then a statement which does not generate a judicial proceeding would not be protected. This determination could not be made until after the statement is
given.
95. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying note 47.
97. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
100. See supra text accompanying note 12.
101. See supra text accompanying note 57.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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